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Abstract
Under what conditions should we expect the United States to support international enforcement of treaties? We hypoth-
esize that U.S. support is most likely for treaties where international enforcement will cause considerable (desired) behav-
ioral change by other countries but little (undesired) behavioral change by the United States. Similarly, U.S. support is least
likely for treaties where international enforcement will generate the converse effects. In developing this hypothesis, we
derive specific conditions under which we should expect U.S. benefits of international enforcement to outweigh U.S. costs
(or vice versa). We also provide empirical examples. Finally, we consider three alternative explanations of U.S. views on in-
ternational enforcement—concern for U.S. sovereignty, desire to prevent infringements on U.S. constitutional protection
of individual rights, and the usefulness of international enforcement as a domestic commitment device. We discuss these
alternative explanatory factors’ relationship to our own hypothesis.
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1. Introduction
To be effective, an international agreement must satisfy
three conditions (Barrett, 2003). First, all of the (major)
countries concerned must participate. Second, the par-
ticipating countries’ commitments must be sufficiently
deep to be able to solve or at least significantly reduce
the problem the agreement aims to alleviate. Finally,
the agreement must achieve high compliance rates. To
fulfill these conditions, the agreement may need to re-
structure the parties’ incentives, and a potentially pow-
erful way to do this is to incorporate provisions for in-
ternational enforcement. As used here, enforcement
refers to the threat or actual use of material conse-
quences1 to enhance treaty compliance, treaty partici-
pation, or both.
Examples of agreements that contain such provisions
include the 1995 WTO agreements, the 1989 Montreal
protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, and
the 1992 Chemical weapons convention. The 1997 Kyoto
protocol, too, includes an enforcement system. In con-
trast, Kyoto’s successor, the 2015 Paris agreement, does
not contain any provisions for enforcement. In this re-
spect, Paris resembles many other environmental agree-
ments, such as the 1999 Gothenburg protocol and the
1985 Helsinki protocol.
1 Failure to comply could also entail “soft” consequences, for example, in the form of loss of reputation (see e.g., Downs & Jones, 2002). Such con-
sequences are not included in the concept of enforcement employed here. Our definition excludes several human rights regimes, which are rarely
enforced through material consequences.
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Two main factors influence whether an international
agreement will come to include international enforce-
ment. The first is whether the agreement has a need for
enforcement, which is often linked to situation structure.
While an agreement aiming to solve a coordination prob-
lem provides no incentive to be noncompliant or to with-
draw, an agreement aiming to solve a collaboration prob-
lem might posit a strong incentive for defection.2 Thus,
it is primarily agreements which aim to solve a collabo-
ration (dilemma-type) problem that have a need for en-
forcement (see e.g., Koremenos, 2007).
Second, even when an agreement has a need for
enforcement, it may be difficult or even impossible to
muster the required support among the negotiating par-
ties for incorporating enforcement provisions (Hovi &
Sprinz, 2006; Underdal, 1980; Ward, Grundig, & Zorick,
2001). The negotiation and design of international agree-
ments (including their system of enforcement) are often
based on the consensus principle, which provides a veto
to each country (or at least to eachmajor country) in the
negotiations. Thus, erecting institutions for international
enforcement typically requires support from each of the
(major) countries involved.
However, the conditions under which (major)
countries can be expected to support—or oppose—
international enforcement remains poorly understood.
With a key focus on five cases of international treaty en-
forcement, we seek to contribute to filling this void by
identifying the main conditions under which one partic-
ularly important country—the United States—is likely to
support (or oppose) international treaty enforcement.3
We assume that the key determinant of U.S. sup-
port for (or opposition to) international enforcement is
whether the United States expects to derive net benefits
from such enforcement. Based on this general hypothe-
sis, we then identify the more specific conditions under
which we should expect the United States to support (or
oppose) international enforcement and exemplify these
expectations with observations from the five cases in fo-
cus.4 To complement our analysis, we also discuss three
other explanations of U.S. support (or opposition) to in-
ternational enforcement. Although the focus here is on
the United States, the inherent logic is arguably generic,
a point we return to in the concluding section.
Our discussion is primarily deductive in nature, but
also draws significantly on data from 14 interviews with
practitioners, observers and experts. The interviewees
were selected on the basis of their experience with
and/or expertise on U.S. foreign policy in general and the
five core cases in particular.5 In the text, interviewees
are referenced by number as listed in the Annex (e.g., I9
refers to interviewee number 9). The Annex also lists the
names and affiliations of those interviewees who permit-
ted such listing.
We proceed as follows. Following a review of the
relevant literature, we develop our hypothesis concern-
ing the circumstances under which the United States
would be likely to support international enforcement.
Next, based on this hypothesis, we identify and exem-
plify more specific conditions under which we should ex-
pect the United States to support (or oppose) interna-
tional enforcement. Then, we discuss the relationship be-
tween our own hypothesis and three other explanations.
Finally, we conclude. Before we embark on our analy-
sis, however, we need to specify in more detail what we
mean by U.S. support of international enforcement.
2. U.S. Support for International Enforcement
Whenwe say that theUnited States supports international
enforcement, we mean that it signals a willingness during
the negotiations to submit to such enforcement, provided
other countries do the same. When we talk about the
United States’ support for international enforcement, we
actually conflate several distinct decision points that in-
volve different U.S. government actors, notably the exec-
utive branch/president and the Senate:6 1) The executive
decides to enter into treaty negotiations; 2) the negotia-
tion team, appointed and instructed by the executive, de-
cides to support inclusion of an enforcement system in the
treaty; 3) the president decides to sign the treaty; 4) the
president decides to send the treaty to the Senate for its
advice and consent; and 5) the Senate decides to adopt
a resolution of ratification. In our analysis, “U.S. support”
for international enforcement refers to the views and deci-
sions of the president’s administration, i.e., the executive
(decision points 1–3). This choice means that when U.S.
ratification requires that the Senate provide its advice and
consent,7 U.S. “support” for international enforcement
may ormay not entail that the United States actually sub-
mits to such enforcement; indeed, it may not even even-
tually become a party to the treaty concerned.8
2 The power of this incentive depends on factors such as whether the agreement is bilateral or multilateral, whether the parties’ commitments are deep
or shallow, and whether strong counteracting international norms exist.
3 In the concluding section, we briefly discuss the generalizability of our conclusions.
4 The treaties that constitute our primary focus are the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the treaties administered by the World Trade Organization, the Chemical Weapons Convention,
and the Rome Statute. To keep the analysis manageable, we focus on this limited number of cases. These cases were chosen because they are signifi-
cant examples of treaties with international enforcement. Together, they cover key areas of international cooperation and international enforcement,
notably international environmental politics, international trade, human rights, and the international regulation of arms.
5 Most interviews were conducted in Washington, DC, from 3 to 11 November 2014. One interview was conducted in Oslo, 14 October 2014.
6 This point, for which we are grateful, was made by one anonymous reviewer.
7 This requirement applies to so-called Article II treaties, which are negotiated under Article II of the U.S. Constitution; however, it does not apply to
other types of international agreements negotiated by the U.S. president, such as Congressional–Executive agreements and Presidential–Executive
agreements (Trimble & Weiss, 1991).
8 The Kyoto protocol provides an example (see below).
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3. Literature Review
To the best of our knowledge, no previous scholarly work
has directly addressed the research question under con-
sideration here. However, we draw on—and contribute
to—four strands of related research.
The first strand seeks to explain why countries create
and empower institutions for international enforcement
or dispute settlement (e.g., Helfer, 2006; Helfer & Slaugh-
ter, 2005; Posner & Yoo, 2005a, 2005b; see also Guzman,
2002). For example, offering a theory of “constrained in-
dependence”, Helfer (2006) argues that countries create
and delegate authority to international courts and tri-
bunals (ICs)9 to enhance the credibility of their own inter-
national commitments. According to him, countries also
seek to prevent ICs from overreaching through the use of
formal, structural, political, and discursive control mech-
anisms (Helfer, 2006).10
In contrast, Posner and Yoo (2005a, 2005b) use a
principal–agent framework to explain when countries
will comply with IC rulings. According to them, adjudica-
tion does not provide incentives for compliance; rather,
it merely adds information. Instead, they argue, reputa-
tion effects and fear of retaliation constitute the main
incentives for compliance.
The theories offered by Helfer and by Posner and Yoo
focus on explaining why countries collectively create ICs,
how they collectively prevent ICs from overreaching, and
why and when they choose to comply (or not to comply)
with IC adjudication. However, these theories are less
helpful for explaining whether a particular country (such
as the United States) individually will support a particular
IC or a particular enforcement institution of another type
(e.g., a compliance committee for an international envi-
ronmental agreement). To explain the emergence and
persistence of an international enforcement institution
it does not suffice to establish a collective motive for this
institution; onemust also establish that eachmajor coun-
try has an individual motive to support it.
The second strand considers U.S views on interna-
tional enforcement in relation to particular treaties. Schol-
ars working in this strand have analyzed how the United
States (and other countries) relate to international en-
forcement in the International Criminal Court (ICC) (e.g.,
Cerone, 2009), in the WTO/GATT (e.g., Dunoff, 2009), in
the North American Free Trade Agreement (e.g., Gantz,
2009; Karamanian, 2009), in theMontreal Protocol (Brack,
2003), in the Kyoto Protocol (Werksman, 2005), in hu-
man rights treaties (Melish, 2009), and in the CWC (Linkie,
2000, pp. 552–553; Robinson, 2008; Sucato, 2006).
Much of this work is obviously relevant for our pa-
per. For instance, with reference to U.S. policies on ICs,
Romano notes that “American attitudes and behaviors
toward international courts are highly contextual, chang-
ing between courts or dispute settlement procedures
and between issues” (2009, p. xix). He further notes that
case studies on human rights regimes suggest “that the
United States conceives of these bodies mostly as a one-
way road—that is, as tools to influence the conduct of
other nations, rather than instruments to affect internal
change” (Romano, 2009, p. xxi). Both of these observa-
tions can be understood in light of our hypothesis that
expected costs and benefits motivate the United States’
support for, or opposition to, international enforcement.
Nevertheless, these scholars’ work differs from ours con-
cerning themain focus. In particular, their work does not
seek to compare and contrast U.S. motives for support-
ing (or opposing) international enforcement across dif-
ferent treaties. Moreover, and perhaps partly as a result
of this more narrow focus, these scholars’ work does not
try to develop a general hypothesis concerning the cir-
cumstances under which the United States might be ex-
pected to support international enforcement.
The third strand seeks to explain compliance with
international agreements. Much research in this strand
relates to the controversy between the “enforcement
school” (e.g., Barrett, 2003; Downs & Jones, 2002;
Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, 1996) and the “manage-
rial school” (e.g., Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1995) over
the effect of enforcement on compliance. Some schol-
ars also aim to build bridges between rationalist the-
ories (the enforcement school) and constructivist the-
ories (the managerial school) concerning the determi-
nants of compliance (e.g., Checkel, 2001). Other impor-
tant work in this strand aims to explain compliance
with treaties—particularly human rights treaties—that
lack enforcementwithmaterial consequences (Simmons,
2000, 2009), or considers how selection effects concern-
ing treaty participation influences compliance (Simmons
& Hopkins, 2005; von Stein, 2005).
We share these scholars’ interest in international en-
forcement; however, their work also differs from ours
concerning the main focus. While scholars working in
strand three focus on the determinants of compliance,
we focus on the political feasibility of international en-
forcement, particularly the determinants of a single coun-
try’s support (or lack of support) for such enforcement.
A second difference has to do with the fact that several
studies in strand three focus on human rights treaties
without material consequences for noncompliance.11 In
9 Following Romano, ICs (sometimes also referred to as international judicial bodies) may be defined as institutions that 1) are permanent, 2) were estab-
lished by an international legal instrument (often a treaty), 3) resort to international law when deciding cases submitted to them, 4) decide such cases
on the basis of pre-existing procedures, and 5) produce legally binding outcomes (1999, pp. 713–714). Because the last criterion rules out some of the
institutions we are interested in (specifically, the compliance committees of the climate and ozone regimes), we prefer to use the term “international
enforcement institutions”.
10 Helfer (2006) also maintains that states use such control mechanisms both before a new IC is established and after it has begun operating, thereby
signaling to IC office holders what types of legal outcomes member states find politically acceptable.
11 An important reason why the United States rarely supports international enforcement for human rights treaties may be that, for such treaties, en-
hanced compliance by other countries would often entail few (if any) benefits to the United States. At the same time, international enforcement might
potentially entail increased compliance costs for the United States—possibly even a risk of political prosecution of U.S. personnel.
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contrast, our hypothesis is developed specifically for
treaties that include such consequences, and we leave
it for future research to consider whether this hypothe-
sis also holds for treaties that only include provisions for
adjudicationwithout anymaterial consequences for non-
compliance or nonparticipation.12
Finally, a fourth strand of relevant research focuses
on the relationship between institutional design and
state behavior. For example,Moe shows how institutions
and their design are not only expressions of cooperation
but also of power (Moe, 2005), while Koremenos, Lipson
and Snidal (2001) identify enforcement as one of three
main channels through which institutional design might
influence such behavior.
The present paper contributes to this fourth strand in
twoways. First, our hypothesis helps explain how a coun-
try’s support (or lack of support) of an international en-
forcement institution depends on the design of the insti-
tution concerned. Second, it highlights the conditions un-
der which a powerful country—the United States—will
support some enforcement institutions but not others.
4. A Simple Hypothesis Concerning U.S. Support for
International Enforcement
Underlying most (if not all) treaties is the idea that a mu-
tual exchange of deep commitments will generate net
benefits for all member countries.13 However, assuming
that other member countries commit deeply and fulfill
their parts of the bargain, a given country might benefit
evenmore if it either fails to make deep commitments or
fails to fulfill someor all of the deep commitments it does
make. Indeed, the possibility that a countrymight seek to
gain a free ride on other countries’ efforts provides an im-
portant motivation to create international enforcement
institutions which can entice member countries to make
deep commitments and fulfill them.
We proceed on the assumption that the United
States will support international enforcement of a given
treaty if (and only if) such enforcement generates net
expected benefits for the United States.14 Given this as-
sumption, U.S. support for international enforcement of
a treaty will depend on the balance of the benefits and
costs that the United States expects to incur from such
enforcement.
U.S. benefits primarily derive from international en-
forcement’s influence on other countries’ behavior. The
more international enforcement can be expected to
change these other member countries’ behavior in the
desired direction (whichmay partly depend on the depth
of these other members’ commitments), the greater
the expected benefits of such enforcement for the
United States.
Similarly, U.S. costs primarily derive from the interna-
tional enforcement institution’s influence on the United
States’ own behavior. The more the United States ex-
pects international enforcement to influence U.S. behav-
ior in a direction that the United States dislikes,15 the
larger the expected costs of such enforcement for the
United States.
Table 1 illustrates how U.S. support for international
enforcement will vary, depending on the extent to which
the United States expects such enforcement to influence
its own and other countries’ behavior.
First, consider the two cells off the main diago-
nal. For these two cells, it is straightforward to predict
the U.S. position concerning international enforcement.
The United States would likely (strongly) support inter-
national enforcement if its own behavior may be ex-
pected to be largely independent of such enforcement,
while other members’ behavior may be expected to be
substantially influenced by it (see the bottom-left cell
in Table 1).
Conversely, the United States would likely (strongly)
oppose international enforcement if it had reason to ex-
pect that such enforcement would influence its own be-
havior substantially and in costly ways, while influencing
other countries’ behavior only moderately (see the top-
right cell in Table 1).16
For cases that fall in the two cells on the main di-
agonal, predicting the U.S. position on international en-
forcement is less straightforward. In either cell, the cost-
benefit balance could be either positive or negative; thus,
whether the United States would support international
enforcement might be in doubt.
However, the two cells on the main diagonal dif-
fer in at least one important respect. If the effect of
enforcement is expected to be modest for all coun-
tries (the bottom-right cell) enforcement will be largely
pointless. Thus, in the bottom-right cell, we expect the
12 One interviewee (I13) remarked that our hypothesis “would not be true with regard to the Geneva Conventions”, adding that “the United States takes
these conventions very seriously and enforces them domestically, which entails costs….There is no guarantee that other countries will also take these
conventions seriously. So the United States implements and enforces treaties even when reciprocity is not guaranteed”.
13 The distinction between deep and shallow commitments is often ascribed to Downs et al. (1996).
14 As one anonymous reviewer rightly pointed out, various actors might “differ in their subjective perceptions of a given treaty’s ‘net expected benefits’.
For example, George W. Bush differed from Richard Nixon on the benefits of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, from Bill Clinton on the benefits of the
Rome Statute, and from Al Gore on the benefits of the Kyoto Protocol. Likewise, Donald Trump perceives the net expected benefits of the Paris Accord,
the TTP, the TTIP, and NAFTA very differently than Barack Obama”. However, the reviewer’s succinct point is probably more important for treaties over-
all than for their international enforcement, the net benefits of which depend on two relatively simple factors: whether it will likely cause significant
behavioral change by the United States and whether it will likely cause significant behavioral change by other countries (see Table 1). This being said,
estimating the expected net benefits of international enforcement can also be challenging and hence controversial in some cases, particularly in those
cases that fall into the top-left cell in Table 1.
15 The extent of the expected U.S. behavioral change may partly depend on the depth of the United States’ own commitments.
16 While our hypothesis was derived on the assumption that states maximize absolute gains, it would be strengthened even further if one were to make
the neorealist assumption that states are (also) concerned with relative gains. For recent studies on how concerns about relative gains might influence
international cooperation regarding trade and environmental problems, see Grundig (2006); Purdon (2013); and Vezirgiannidou (2008).
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Table 1. U.S. support for and opposition to enforcement by enforcement’s expected effect on its own and other countries’
behavior.
Expected effect of international
enforcement on other countries’ behavior
Substantial Modest
Expected effect of
international enforcement
on U.S. behavior
Substantial
Moderate support or
opposition, depending on
the benefit-cost balance
Strong opposition
Modest Strong support Indifference
United States to be largely indifferent to international
enforcement.
In contrast, if the effect of international enforcement
is expected to be substantial for all countries (the top-
left cell), enforcement might make a substantial differ-
ence to the treaty’s effectiveness. Thus, both U.S. ben-
efits and U.S costs might be substantial. If the United
States expects its substantial benefits from international
enforcement to slightly outweigh its substantial costs, it
would then likely moderately support such enforcement.
Conversely, if the United States expects its substantial
costs from international enforcement to somewhat out-
weigh its substantial benefits, it would likely moderately
oppose such enforcement.
We now develop these initial considerations in more
detail and consider how they might throw light on U.S.
support (or lack of support) of international enforce-
ment. In doing so, we use the five treaties that constitute
this paper’s main focus as examples.
4.1. When Would the United States Support
International Enforcement?
Table 1 suggests that the United States would support
international enforcement under (at least) four sets of
circumstances.
First, the United States would support international
enforcement of treaties for which 1) the United States
has only shallow commitments, while 2) some or all
other countries have deep commitments, and 3) the
United States expects enforcement to enhance these
other countries’ compliance substantially. Compliance
with shallow commitments is by definition nearly cost-
free; thus, international enforcement under these cir-
cumstances would likely entail few (if any) costs for
the United States. Simultaneously, the United States
would likely benefit substantially from the positive in-
fluence of international enforcement on other mem-
bers’ compliance.
Consider the 1989 Montreal Protocol. The construc-
tion of this treaty arguably followed a more general U.S.
practice concerning international environmental agree-
ments, namely “to act first at home, and then to build on
that approach at the international level” (Purvis, 2004,
p. 175). Thus, Montreal largely extended to other coun-
tries regulations which were similar to those which had
already been adopted by the United States. U.S. com-
mitments were, therefore, shallow (they required little
policy change); in contrast, commitments were deeper
for other countries, which had not yet—when the treaty
was being negotiated—introduced regulations similar to
those required by Montreal.
Thus, the inclusion of trade restrictions to enforce
participation in and compliance with the Montreal Pro-
tocol was supported by the United States; indeed, it was
largely based on a U.S. proposal (Benedick, 1991, p. 91).
As one of our interviewees (I6) put it, “The United States
expected it would comply with the freeze and phase-out.
Moreover, U.S. business wanted control with the substi-
tutes market. Enforcement was important to us because
we had to make sure there was no leakage of banned
CFCs from parties in noncompliance or from non-parties.
The best way to do this was trade restrictions, so we pur-
sued a ban on trade with non-parties and countries in
noncompliance”.
The trade restrictions might have positively influ-
enced other countries’ willingness to participate in and
comply with the Montreal Protocol. Indeed, anecdotal
evidence suggests that they have induced some coun-
tries to accede to the treaty (after having come to rec-
ognize the drawbacks of being excluded from Western
markets) and that they have also improved compliance
(Brack, 2003, p. 220; see also Aakre, Helland, & Hovi,
2016, p. 1320). Since the trade restrictions could be ex-
pected to enhance participation and compliance while
having little, if any, influence on U.S. policies, it is hardly
surprising that the United States so eagerly supported
their inclusion.
Second, we should also expect the United States to
support international enforcement of treaties in which
the United States 1) has a deep commitment, yet 2) ex-
pects to be fully compliant independent of international
enforcement, while 3) expecting international enforce-
ment to substantially enhance other countries’ compli-
ance. The reason the United States expects to be fully
compliant even without enforcement might originate
from normative political factors (e.g., political pressure
from other countries or from domestic environmental
groups) or from institutional features (e.g., the possibility
that NGOs would take domestic legal action).
Consider the Kyoto Protocol. In the environmental
politics literature, it is commonly held that if the United
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States ratifies an environmental treaty, it will also comply
with it. Most (if not all) of our interviewees seemed to
share this view. To name only one example, I4 said, “The
United States is often compliant anywaywith the treaties
we sign and ratify, so the United States will benefit from
enforcement of other countries’ commitments”.
According to Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution, “all
Treaties made…under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land”.17 Hence, if U.S.
authorities ratify a treaty yet fail to comply with its regu-
lations, they can be sued by, say, an environmental NGO.
Such resort to domestic courts to enforce international
regulatory standards is far more common in the United
States than in, say, European countries (Brunnée, 2004,
p. 640). As a result, U.S. negotiators will often bemore re-
luctant than other countries’ negotiators to accept strin-
gent international commitments (Wiener, 2003, p. 647).
Other things being equal, however, the possibility of do-
mestic enforcement also makes it more likely that the
United States would comply with the commitments it
does accept.
Hence, during the negotiations over Kyoto’s enforce-
ment system, the U.S. administration had reason to
believe that—even if the United States were to ratify
Kyoto—international enforcement would largely make a
difference for other countries’ compliance. The strong
U.S. support for strict enforcement of Kyoto is therefore
understandable. As I11 commented: “If theUnited States
ratifies a treaty, it will likely obey it; that is part of the
reason why we will often push for strict enforcement,
to ensure that others will also comply”.18 To the extent
that enforcement would enhance other countries’ com-
pliance with Kyoto, the United States would benefit both
in terms of reduced global warming and in terms of there
being fewer detrimental economic competition effects.
Third, we should also expect the United States to
support international enforcement for treaties in which
1) the United States and other countries have deep com-
mitments, 2) the United States expects enforcement to
enhance those other countries’ compliance, and 3) the
United States is either exempt from enforcement or able
to block enforcement measures against itself. Again, en-
forcement of treaties where these conditions hold will
promote other countries’ compliance (and thus entail
positive benefits for the United States), while having lit-
tle influence on U.S. behavior (and thus entailing few, if
any, costs).
Consider the CWC, which gives the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) the au-
thority to suspend a noncompliant Party’s privileges un-
der the treaty and to recommend sanctions based upon
the collective action of the other States Parties (Arti-
cle XII). In cases of “particular gravity”, the OPCW may
also consult with the UN Security Council to request
harsher sanctions or even military action if necessary.
Assuming that international enforcement would en-
hance other States Parties’ compliance with the CWC,
the United States would benefit because of the reduced
risk of exposure to hazardous chemicals for U.S. person-
nel engaged in U.S. military action abroad.
Concerning U.S. costs from enforcement, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that U.S. noncompliancewith the CWC
was a real possibility; indeed, according to one estimate,
the United States would not meet the deadline that ex-
pired on 31 December 2012.19 Moreover, the Conven-
tion’s enforcement system does not enable U.S. preven-
tion of all kinds of enforcement against the United States.
In particular, the United States may be unable to pre-
vent the OPCW from suspending U.S. privileges under
the Convention (such as the right to vote and the right to
request an “on-site challenge inspection” of any facility
or location controlled by one of the other States Parties).
It may also be unable to prevent the OPCW from recom-
mending voluntary sanctions against the United States.
However, as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, it can veto use of the OPCW’s most potent en-
forcement measures—mandatory sanctions or even mil-
itary action imposed through a UN Security Council res-
olution. In this respect, the United States differs signifi-
cantly from most other States Parties to the CWC.
The role of the UN Security Council also protects the
United States against abuse of the CWC enforcement sys-
tem. According to I11, such protection was a major con-
cern for the United States:
The defense department had no strong interest in
chemical weapons, so there was relatively little con-
troversy on the substance. The biggest controversy
concerned two points: 1) there should be effective
enforcement and monitoring, and 2) there should
be protection against abuse of the enforcement
mechanisms.
Finally, we should also expect the United States to sup-
port international enforcement for treaties in which
1) the United States and other countries have deep com-
mitments, 2) the United States expects enforcement to
enhance its own and other countries’ compliance, pro-
vided that 3) the United States believes that the addi-
tional benefits it will derive from the increase in other
countries’ compliance will outweigh its own additional
costs of compliance.
Consider the 1995 creation of the WTO, which signif-
icantly strengthened the world trade dispute-settlement
17 This provision concerns self-executing treaties. If a treaty is not self-executing, enabling legislation is required to ensure its implementation. Normally,
a non-self-executing treaty would not be ratified without enabling legislation. For a definition of self-executing agreement, see for example, Wex Legal
Dictionary, available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_executing_treaty
18 I15 offered a different explanation for U.S. support for international enforcement: “Concerning the Kyoto Protocol, an explanation for the U.S. position
on enforcement may be found in the U.S. position on the flexibility mechanisms. These emissions trading mechanisms were important to the United
States. A strict enforcement regimewas seen as justified, in part because of the need for legal certainty for the effective functioning of carbonmarkets”.
19 Arms Control Association, “Chemical Weapons Convention at a Glance”, available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance
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mechanisms, compared to previous GATT arrangements
(Bello, 1996). The new mechanisms entail, among other
things, that a consensus is now required to reject a
panel report. Hence, a country can no longer veto a com-
plainant’s request for permission to enact countermea-
sures against it.
The new mechanisms provoked considerable contro-
versy in the United States. Major concerns included the
fear that the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
might “threaten U.S. sovereignty and undermine the ef-
fectiveness of section 301” (Dunoff, 2009). Ultimately,
however, the U.S. administration concluded that the ben-
efits outweighed the costs and the United States became
a member from 1 January 1995.
Stricter enforcement of WTO treaties could be ex-
pected to cause increased adherence to WTO regula-
tions by other countries, which would entail beneficial
competition effects for the United States. On the other
hand, it could also entail increased costs, by enhanc-
ing U.S. compliance. According to I3, the U.S. admin-
istration expected the benefits to outweigh the costs:
“It was clear [during the Uruguay Round negotiations]
that the United States would win more than it would
lose [from strictWTO enforcement], because the United
States was [already] complying more than most other
countries did”. Similarly, I1 said, “The United States
would be less likely to violate than other countries and
could use the new enforcement system to ‘lock in’ these
other countries”.
The views of I3 and I1mirror those expressed by Bello
and Holmer (1994). Stating that the U.S. advantages of
the DSU would outweigh any U.S. disadvantages, they
emphasize that “the United States likely will…be a plain-
tiff in WTO dispute settlement proceedings at least as of-
ten as it proves to be a defendant”. They go on to argue
that “as the world’s largest exporter, the United States
has at least as much interest in the international trading
system and theWTO as any other nation on earth” (Bello
& Holmer, 1994, pp. 1102–1103).
A similar viewwas also expressed by the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative in the Executive Office of the
President of the United States:
To ensure that the United States secures the full bene-
fits of theWTO Agreements, the United States sought
and obtained a strong, binding and expeditious dis-
pute settlement process for the WTO….As a result,
under the WTO we have better enforcement of U.S.
rights and more certainty that our trading partners
will abide by the rules and open their markets to
American exports. (as cited in Bacchus, 2003, p. 440)
It is worth noting that the United States has a reasonably
good track record concerning compliance with adverse
WTO dispute settlement rulings (Bown, 2005; Wilson,
2007). It thus seems that the U.S. views concerning the
DSU in the mid-1990s have continued to prevail in the
years following the U.S. accession to the WTO treaties.
4.2. When Would the United States Oppose
International Enforcement?
The logic underlying Table 1 suggests that the United
States would decline to support international enforce-
ment under at least two sets of circumstances.
First, we should expect the United States to oppose
international enforcement if 1) the United States has
deep commitments that are 2) only partly under the con-
trol of U.S. authorities, while 3) most or even all other
member countries have only shallow commitments. In-
ternational enforcement may then be expected to en-
tail significant costs for the United States. In addition, in-
ternational enforcement would require little behavioral
change for other countries and would thus produce few
(if any) benefits for the United States. Under these cir-
cumstances, international enforcement would likely pro-
duce net costs for the United States.
Consider the ICC. According to Posner and Yoo
(2005b, p. 970), the ICC’s members “consist mainly of
states who do not expect that their citizens will commit
war crimes or human rights violations on foreign soil”. If
their account is correct, the ICC will require little or no
behavioral change by these member countries and will,
therefore, impose few if any costs on them. Thus, the
benefits provided by the ICC for the United States are
likely to be small or even nonexistent. In contrast, the
United States and other major powers that “foresee a
need to engage in significant military action” (Posner &
Yoo, 2005b, p. 970) might well face substantial costs by
submitting to international enforcement of war crimes.
In addition, the ICCmight entail a risk of political prosecu-
tion, perhaps even more so than in the case of the CWC.
The desire to avoid these costs helps explain why the
United States has declined to submit to ICC enforcement.
In the words of I8, “As a great power, the United States
is special, with worldwide reach. It is therefore uniquely
at risk all over the world”. I8 added that there is “real
fear among conservatives that the ICC would be used,
not only against dictators, but also against the United
States, for political reasons”. Similarly, I5 said that “as a
global power we would be more likely to be exposed to
prosecution”. I5 added: “As reflected in President Bush’s
unsigning of the Rome Statute, wemight be an attractive
target for certain other countries”. I11went even further:
The objection was that, rightly or wrongly, you might
get political prosecution, such as prosecution of
Kissinger for the bombing of Cambodia or prosecu-
tion of Obama for the bombing of Libya. Sure, had the
UN Security Council been in control, we would likely
have agreed to participate in the ICC. But there was
widespread fear of political prosecution. People said
things like: “If you like Kenneth Starr, you are going to
love the ICC.”
Second, and finally, we should also expect the United
States to oppose international enforcement of treaties in
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which 1) theUnited States and other countries have deep
commitments, 2) the United States expects enforcement
to enhance its own and other countries’ compliance, but
3) the United States expects that the benefits it will de-
rive from the increase in other countries’ compliancewill
be outweighed by the increase in its own compliance
costs. None of the five treaties that constitute this pa-
per’s main focus would immediately seem to fit this pos-
sibility, at least not at the time when the treaties were
negotiated. Following the current protectionist wave in
U.S. politics, however, the U.S. calculus concerning in-
ternational enforcement of the WTO agreements might
change, perhaps even tipping the benefit-cost balance
to replace U.S. support for international enforcement by
U.S. opposition.
5. Other Explanations
What is the relationship between our hypothesis and
other possible explanations of U.S. support for and oppo-
sition to international enforcement? In this section, we
consider three such other explanations.
5.1. Concern for U.S. Sovereignty
Practically all our interviewees mentioned sovereignty
issues as being key to understanding U.S. positions on
international enforcement. Several interviewees argued
that when international enforcement is perceived to
be associated with sovereignty issues, it may prevent
U.S. support for international enforcement even in cases
where such enforcement would entail net U.S. benefits
in terms of behavioral change. For instance, I7 argued
that our hypothesis “omits an important non-monetary
cost: U.S. sovereignty. Ensuring U.S. sovereignty mas-
sively outweighs the material or security gain that could
be achieved [through an international enforcement sys-
tem]”. Similarly, pointing to the Senate’s significant role in
the ratification process, I8 commented that “members of
the Senate do not base their decisions on rational analy-
sis of costs and benefits; rather, they base their decisions
on politics and sovereignty concerns. The administration
often faces a big opposition on giving up sovereignty”.
With specific reference to arms control treaties, I1 stated
that “it is a question of how intrusive inspections are, but
they will involve sovereignty concessions”.
Most treaties require states to give up sovereignty;
hence, a key question is why sovereignty issues would
bar U.S. support for some international enforcement sys-
tems but not for others. Responding to this question,
interviewees pointed—directly or indirectly—to the ex-
tent to which agreements are clearly defined or open-
ended. This distinction was particularly highlighted by I7,
who emphasized that “the United States would…be leery
towards treaties with open-ended obligations”. Explain-
ing the point, I7 invoked the example of the Arms Trade
Treaty: “Key terms in this treaty are interpreted differ-
ently; there is no consensus on key terms. Indeed, many
core terms cannot be defined precisely. This implies an
open-endedness that the United States should not be a
party to”.
Several interviewees identified a similar problem
with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). I3 explained:
Some in the Senate are concerned about signing the
United States up to compulsory dispute settlement
under the Convention. The Convention excludes from
dispute settlement those disputes that involve ‘mili-
tary activities’, but some fear that a tribunal might not
honor the U.S.’s assessment of what constitutes a U.S.
‘military’ activity.
Open-ended agreements are perceived as a sovereignty
issue because they imply that “countries do not know
what they sign on to” (I7). For open-ended agreements,
international enforcement “wouldmean that obligations
can be designed by third parties” (I7). I2 said that “U.S.
decision makers generally dislike the idea of having a
committee decide what the United States should do”:
Similarly, I14 stated that:
treaties that give authority to a foreign agency with-
out Senate advice and consent would not be [per-
ceived to be] in the interest of the American people.
A widespread view is that sovereign states should not
be dictated to by some foreign power or bureaucracy.
Two treaties in particular were often mentioned by
interviewees—the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (the Disabilities Convention) and UNC-
LOS. Interestingly, these treaties share some common
features. One is that they do not include international
enforcement (in the sense of this paper).20 The Disabil-
ities Convention’s Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities monitors compliance; however, it can-
not impose any material consequences on noncompli-
ant countries.21 Similarly, although UNCLOS has an elab-
oratemechanism for peaceful dispute settlement, includ-
ing various arbitration panels and the International Tri-
bunal on the Law of the Sea, it includes no material con-
sequences to enforce these bodies’ verdicts.22
A second shared feature is that existing U.S. poli-
cies are largely in line with both treaties’ provisions.23
With regard to UNCLOS, Borgerson contends, “While the
United States treats most parts of the convention as cus-
20 These treaties’ lack of enforcement mechanism as defined in this paper is also the reason why these treaties are not included in our core set of cases
considered.
21 See Articles 35 and 36 for the monitoring provisions of the Convention. Available at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml
22 See Boyle (2001) for an analysis of the dispute settlement system of UNCLOS.
23 Provisions concerning the deep seabed, that is, “the design of and the powers to be given to the new regime for governance of the mineral resource
recovery in the area beyond national jurisdiction” are contested (Borgerson, 2009, p. 11).
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tomary law, it remains among a handful of countries…to
have signed but not yet acceded to the treaty” (2009,
p. 3). Similarly, with regard to the Disabilities Conven-
tion, the report that accompanied the Letter of Trans-
mittal (from the President to the Senate) declared that
“the United States would be able to implement its obli-
gations under the convention using its vast existing net-
works of laws affording protection to persons with dis-
abilities. Therefore, no new legislationwould be required
to ratify and implement the convention”.24 The letter fur-
ther stated that “the provisions of the convention are not
self-executing, and thus would not be directly enforced
by U.S. courts or of itself [sic] give rise to individually en-
forceable rights”.25
Sovereignty issuesmaybeparticularly prone tobede-
cisive in situations where enforcement’s effect on both
one’s own and others’ behavior is expected to be mod-
est (see the bottom-right cell in Table 1). In such sit-
uations, a country’s position concerning international
enforcement—and indeed concerning the treaty itself—
would likely be determined by factors such as principles,
and sovereignty might be one such principle. In these
two cases, however, sovereignty concerns did not pre-
vent theU.S. administration from supporting the treaties.
The (renegotiated) UNCLOSwas signed by the Clinton ad-
ministration in June 1995 and the Disabilities Convention
was signed by the Obama administration in June 2009.26
In the Senate, on the other hand, the Disabilities Conven-
tion raised concerns over sovereignty. For instance, Sen-
ator Inhofe (R-OK) stated:
I do oppose the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities because I think it
does infringe upon our sovereignty, establishing an
unelected United Nations bureaucratic body called
the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities and a Conference of States Parties. These
unelected bureaucratic bodies would implement the
treaty and pass so-called recommendations that
would be forced upon the United Nations and the
United States if the United States is a signatory.27
In response to this argument and to similar arguments
from other senators, Senator Kerry (D-MA) remarked:
the Senator mentioned the question of a committee
being created, and sometimes committees make rec-
ommendations outside of the purview of something.
That may be true. But when have words, I ask the
Senator—when have words or suggestions that have
no power, that cannot be implemented, that have no
access to the courts, that have no effect on the law of
the United States and cannot change the law of the
United States—when has that ever threatened any-
body in our country?28
It thus seems that sovereigntymay be a decisive factor in
cases where both the material costs and the benefits of
international enforcement aremodest. In the case of the
Disabilities Convention, U.S. benefits of international en-
forcement would be marginal, whereas the political cost
of pursuing the issue in the Senate could be significant,
which may contribute to explaining why the administra-
tion chose not to pursue the advice and consent of the
Senate further.
In contrast, whenmaterial costs and benefits are sub-
stantial, sovereignty appears less likely to be decisive. For
example, sovereignty clearly played a role in the debate
over U.S. participation in the WTO agreements; however,
ultimately concerns over sovereignty gave way to pecu-
niary considerations. Hence, the United States acceded
to theWTO treaties and supported international enforce-
ment of them. Similarly, sovereignty concerns did not pre-
vent the United States from ratifying the Montreal Proto-
col or the CWC. Nor were concerns about sovereignty a
central argument against U.S. ratification of Kyoto; rather,
the Senate’s resistance was largely based on concerns
about Kyoto’s likely effect on the U.S. economy.
Thus, our hypothesis facilitates mapping the condi-
tions under which we should expect the United States
to accept restraints on its sovereignty. In particular, our
hypothesis suggests that the United States would accept
such restraints if 1) other countries also accept restraints
on their sovereignty and 2) the U.S. restraints are largely
formal whereas other countries’ restraints are substantive
(thereby influencing these countries’ behavior in a way
that benefits the United States). However, as emphasized
by some of our interviewees, open-ended commitments
might make it difficult to foresee whether U.S. restraints
on sovereignty will prove substantive or largely formal.
5.2. Desire to Prevent Infringements on U.S.
Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights
One interviewee (I5) suggested that the United States is
particularly reluctant to join international enforcement
systems for treaties involving individual rights. I5 said
that “the United States has problems with international
enforcement in caseswhere individuals are involved”. Us-
ing the ICC as an example, I5 continued:
In the United States, domestic statute is required for
criminal prosecution. There are many constitutional
protections of individual liberties and criminal en-
24 Letter of transmittal, Treaty number 112-7, available at: https://www.congress.gov/112/cdoc/tdoc7/CDOC-112tdoc7.pdf
25 Letter of transmittal, Treaty number 112-7, available at: https://www.congress.gov/112/cdoc/tdoc7/CDOC-112tdoc7.pdf
26 Treaties pending in the Senate, U.S. Department of State, available at: http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending
27 Congressional Record, Senate S7366, 4 December 2012, available at: https://www.congress.gov/crec/2012/12/04/CREC-2012-12-04-pt1-PgS7365-
2.pdf
28 Congressional Record, Senate S7369, 4 December 2012, available at: https://www.congress.gov/crec/2012/12/04/CREC-2012-12-04-pt1-PgS7365-
2.pdf
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forcement raises some of those core constitutional
protections. Taking away someone’s liberty is a very
serious matter and that makes the ICC different from
international enforcement more generally.
For treaties with enforcement systems that influence in-
dividual rights, the costs (i.e., the potential violation of
U.S. citizens’ constitutional rights) might outweigh the
benefits of joining the treaty. A case in point is the ICC,
whose jurisdiction implies potential prosecution of indi-
vidual U.S. citizens in situations where U.S. courts have
dismissed the case. One interviewee (I11) maintained
that “although ICC prosecution of U.S. personnel would
likely be rare [because of U.S. domestic enforcement],
there was the possibility of political prosecution. And po-
litical cases are exactly the cases we are unlikely to pur-
sue domestically” (emphasis added).
To determine the conditions under which a concern
for individual-rights weighs more heavily for U.S. support
or opposition to international enforcement thanmaterial
costs and benefits do, wewould need to consider treaties
forwhich the desire to protectU.S. citizens’ constitutional
rights points in one direction, whereas material costs and
benefits point in the opposite direction. For example, we
could consider treaties for which the individual-rights ex-
planation points in the direction of U.S. opposition to in-
ternational enforcement, while U.S. net benefits derived
from the influence of enforcement on countries’ behav-
ior point in the direction of U.S. support.
We do not exclude the possibility that such treaties
actually exist; however, none of the treaties that con-
stitute our main focus satisfy this criterion. In particu-
lar, concerning the ICC, the individual-rights hypothesis
points in the same direction as our hypothesis does: Both
lead us to expect the United States to be reluctant to sub-
mit to international enforcement concerning war crimes.
Thus, determining which of these hypotheses best ex-
plains U.S. nonparticipation in the ICC must be left for
future research.
5.3. Usefulness of International Enforcement as a
Domestic Commitment Device
Referring to U.S. participation in theWTO, some intervie-
wees mentioned that international enforcement can be
useful for U.S. authorities as a domestic commitment de-
vice. For example, seeing U.S. participation in the WTO
even as an instrument to curbU.S. protectionism, I16 em-
phasized how the risk of penalization could beused in the
domestic debate on protectionist measures: “Domestic
commitments are important in the case of the WTO. U.S.
authorities can say, ‘If we do this, then we will be penal-
ized’. So the WTO enforcement system can be used do-
mestically to counter calls for protectionism”. This point
was also made by I7: “The U.S. turn to free trade was pri-
marily to curb U.S. protectionism, which only could be
achieved if everyone else also pursued free trade”.
The domestic-commitment argument is well known
from the literature on trade policy. In the GATT/WTO le-
gal system, it is generally considered desirable to settle
disputes through agreement among the parties to the
dispute. Nevertheless, Hudec, Kennedy and Sgarbossa
(1993) find that almost 50% of the disputes in the 1948–
1990 period ended in a ruling rather than in a negotiated
settlement. According to them, the reason is political:
It may be that defendant governments find it difficult
to settle once the complaint is launched. The political
costs of agreeing to modify or remove a trade barrier
can be quite high. It may be better to fight and lose
in a lawsuit because then the unpleasant corrective
action can be blamed squarely on GATT law. (Hudec
et al., 1993, p. 8)
Incorporating this function of enforcement into the calcu-
lus underlying our hypothesis would mean adding polit-
ical benefits, thereby strengthening the overall balance
between U.S. benefits and U.S. costs. For enforcement
systems that essentially influence other countries’ behav-
ior while having little effect on U.S. behavior (bottom-left
cell in Table 1), taking this function into accountwill there-
fore simply add to the already strongly positive U.S. ma-
terial net benefits. Moreover, for enforcement systems
that essentially influence U.S. behavior (top-right cell in
Table 1), the domestic-commitment argument will im-
prove an otherwise negative balance; however, it must
carry very high weight to be able to outweigh strongly
negative material net benefits. In contrast, for enforce-
ment systems having a significant impact on the United
States’ and other countries’ behavior (top-left cell in Ta-
ble 1), the domestic-commitment argument might—in
some cases—plausibly cause a (slightly) negative U.S.ma-
terial benefit-cost balance to become positive when the
domestic commitment effect is also taken into account.
The difference between these three types of case
helps explain why the domestic-commitment argument
is typically linked to international trade and the WTO
treaties (which we have previously placed in the upper-
left cell in Table 1), while rarely (if ever) beingmentioned
for the other treaties that constitute our main focus.29
Thus, just as in the case of the sovereignty argument, our
hypothesis seems helpful for determining the conditions
under which the domestic-commitment argument may
be expected to influence the U.S. position concerning in-
ternational enforcement.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a simple hypothesis
concerning the circumstances under which the United
29 Moravcsik (2000) argues that the domestic commitment argument is highly relevant also for human-rights regimes; in particular, newly established
(or reestablished) democracies tend to support international human rights adjudication and enforcement to lock in the political status quo against
domestic political opponents.
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States would likely support international enforcement of
treaties. According to this hypothesis, a key determinant
is whether the United States can reasonably expect inter-
national enforcement to generate net U.S. benefits. Net
U.S. benefits are most likely for treaties where interna-
tional enforcement will largely influence other countries’
behavior (in the direction desired by the United States),
and least likely for treaties where international enforce-
ment will largely influence U.S. behavior.
Based on this hypothesis, we identified several condi-
tions under which we should expect the United States to
support (or oppose) international enforcement and com-
pared these expectations to observations from five cases
of international enforcement. The analysis indicates that
our hypothesis indeed provides a plausible explanation
for why the United States supports international enforce-
ment for the WTO treaties, the Montreal Protocol, and
the CWC, why it also supported international enforce-
ment in the Kyoto negotiations, and why it does not par-
ticipate in the ICC.
Our analysis indicates, moreover, that in situations
where material costs and/or benefits are substantial, a
concern for these costs and benefits are likely to de-
termine the U.S. response. In situations where material
costs and benefits aremodest, however, sovereignty con-
cerns will likely determine the U.S. response. Moreover,
in situationswhereU.S. benefits only outweighU.S. costs
by a fairly narrowmargin, the desire to use international
enforcement as a domestic commitment devicemay play
an important role.
Our hypothesis thus seems to offer a simple yet fruitful
baseline for explaining U.S. views on international enforce-
ment. In addition to explaining the U.S. position on inter-
national enforcement of the treaties mentioned above, it
also provides guidance for demarcating the conditions un-
der which factors such as sovereignty and the usefulness
of international enforcement as a domestic commitment
device might play a decisive role for this position.
To what extent may our hypothesis be expected to
hold also for other countries than the United States?
Clearly, the logic underlying Table 1 is generic: The
change that international enforcement causes in other
countries’ behavior tends to generate benefits, while the
change it causes in a country’s own behavior tends to
generate costs. However, the circumstances under which
enforcement will generate substantial benefits and only
moderate costs (or vice versa) will likely vary from one
country to another. First, domestic political and legal in-
stitutions differ across countries. For example, few other
countries offer possibilities for domestic enforcement of
their own treaty compliance comparable to those exist-
ing in the United States. Similarly, few other countries
can expect to influence the design of a treaty as much as
the United States influenced the design of (say) theMon-
treal Protocol. Also, only four other countries hold veto
power in the UN Security Council.
Second, as a rule, major powers such as the United
States will likely be able to obtain indemnity from en-
forcement more often than other countries will. Excep-
tions exist, however. Consider the Kyoto Protocol, where
enforcement applies only to Annex I (developed) coun-
tries. While initially reluctant to accept international en-
forcement, developing countries turned into strong sup-
porters of such enforcement once it became clear that
it would not apply to them (Werksman, 1996, p. 95). An
important factor making the developing-country exemp-
tion from international enforcement feasible was Kyoto’s
classification of the parties into Annex B (developed) and
non-Annex B (developing) countries, with only the for-
mer having binding emissions limitation commitments.
In conclusion, our hypothesis provides a promising
starting point even for explaining other countries’ views
on international enforcement. Thus, it should represent
a step forward for mapping the conditions under which
the incorporation of enforcement measures in treaties
is likely to be politically feasible. However, in applying
our hypotheses to other countries, one should always
be careful to consider the international position and do-
mestic institutions of the country under consideration,
as well as the specifics of each treaty.
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